Roger L. Martin

Quando Roberto Goizueta morreu de câncer em 1997, aos 65 anos, ele era bilionário. Nada mal para um emigrante cubano que veio para os Estados Unidos quando era adolescente. Ele não foi de forma alguma o primeiro imigrante nos Estados Unidos a se tornar bilionário, mas os outros fizeram fortuna fundando e construindo empresas ou tornando-as públicas. Goizueta se tornou CEO da Coca-Cola.

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Reprint: R1410B
Since 1960 the U.S. economy has moved from largely financing the exploitation of natural resources to making the most of talent. The rewards to executives and financiers have skyrocketed as a result. But over the past two decades or so, the author argues, it has become increasingly clear that much of this talent is trading value rather than creating it: The fastest-growing group on the Forbes 400 list is hedge fund managers. What&#8217;s more, stock-based incentives, which were intended to align the interests of top executives with those of long-term shareholders, are actually encouraging CEOs to serve the interests of short-term traders. The losers in this game are employees engaged in routine work, whose rewards are shrinking or whose jobs are disappearing.
This state of affairs has created a growing&#8212;and unsustainable&#8212;inequality of income. Martin suggests that three things must happen if we are to avoid radical and talent-hostile steps imposed through the ballot box: (1) Talent must exert some self-discipline and lower its expectations. (2) Investors&#8212;primarily pension and sovereign wealth funds&#8212;must prioritize value creation. That means not voting in support of stock-based compensation and no longer supplying hedge funds with large amounts of capital or lending them stock. (3) Government should regulate the relationship between hedge funds and pension funds (if the latter don&#8217;t do so voluntarily), tax &#8220;carried interest&#8221; as ordinary income, tax trades, and revisit the overall tax structure.

The Rise (and Likely Fall) of the Talent Economy

Reimpressão: R1410B Desde 1960, a economia dos EUA deixou de financiar amplamente a exploração de recursos naturais para aproveitar ao máximo os talentos. Como resultado, as recompensas para executivos e financiadores dispararam. Mas nas últimas duas décadas, argumenta o autor, ficou cada vez mais claro que grande parte desse talento está negociando valor em vez de criá-lo: o grupo que mais cresce no Forbes A lista 400 é composta por gestores de fundos de hedge. Além disso, os incentivos baseados em ações, destinados a alinhar os interesses dos principais executivos com os dos acionistas de longo prazo, estão, na verdade, incentivando os CEOs a atenderem aos interesses dos negociadores de curto prazo. Os perdedores neste jogo são funcionários engajados em trabalhos rotineiros, cujas recompensas estão diminuindo ou cujos empregos estão desaparecendo. Esse estado de coisas criou uma crescente e insustentável desigualdade de renda. Martin sugere que três coisas devem acontecer se quisermos evitar medidas radicais e hostis ao talento impostas pelas urnas eleitorais: (1) O talento deve exercer alguma autodisciplina e reduzir suas expectativas. (2) Os investidores — principalmente fundos de pensão e fundos soberanos — devem priorizar a criação de valor. Isso significa não votar a favor da compensação baseada em ações e não mais fornecer grandes quantidades de capital aos fundos de hedge ou emprestar-lhes ações. (3) O governo deve regular a relação entre fundos de hedge e fundos de pensão (se estes não o fizerem voluntariamente), tributar os “juros transportados” como renda ordinária, negociar impostos e revisitar a estrutura tributária geral.

A ascens&atilde;o (e prov&aacute;vel queda) da economia de talentos

Reprint: R1410B Since 1960 the U.S. economy has moved from largely financing the exploitation of natural resources to making the most of talent. The rewards to executives and financiers have skyrocketed as a result. But over the past two decades or so, the author argues, it has become increasingly clear that much of this talent is trading value rather than creating it: The fastest-growing group on the Forbes 400 list is hedge fund managers. What’s more, stock-based incentives, which were intended to align the interests of top executives with those of long-term shareholders, are actually encouraging CEOs to serve the interests of short-term traders. The losers in this game are employees engaged in routine work, whose rewards are shrinking or whose jobs are disappearing. This state of affairs has created a growing—and unsustainable—inequality of income. Martin suggests that three things must happen if we are to avoid radical and talent-hostile steps imposed through the ballot box: (1) Talent must exert some self-discipline and lower its expectations. (2) Investors—primarily pension and sovereign wealth funds—must prioritize value creation. That means not voting in support of stock-based compensation and no longer supplying hedge funds with large amounts of capital or lending them stock. (3) Government should regulate the relationship between hedge funds and pension funds (if the latter don’t do so voluntarily), tax “carried interest” as ordinary income, tax trades, and revisit the overall tax structure.

A ascensão (e provável queda) da economia de talentos

Resumo.

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