Roger L. Martin

Cuando Roberto Goizueta murió de cáncer en 1997, a los 65 años, era multimillonario. Nada mal para un emigrado cubano que había llegado a los Estados Unidos de adolescente. No fue en absoluto el primer inmigrante a Estados Unidos en convertirse en multimillonario, pero los demás hicieron su fortuna fundando y construyendo empresas o haciéndolas públicas. Goizueta lo hizo como CEO de Coca-Cola.

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Reprint: R1410B
Since 1960 the U.S. economy has moved from largely financing the exploitation of natural resources to making the most of talent. The rewards to executives and financiers have skyrocketed as a result. But over the past two decades or so, the author argues, it has become increasingly clear that much of this talent is trading value rather than creating it: The fastest-growing group on the Forbes 400 list is hedge fund managers. What&#8217;s more, stock-based incentives, which were intended to align the interests of top executives with those of long-term shareholders, are actually encouraging CEOs to serve the interests of short-term traders. The losers in this game are employees engaged in routine work, whose rewards are shrinking or whose jobs are disappearing.
This state of affairs has created a growing&#8212;and unsustainable&#8212;inequality of income. Martin suggests that three things must happen if we are to avoid radical and talent-hostile steps imposed through the ballot box: (1) Talent must exert some self-discipline and lower its expectations. (2) Investors&#8212;primarily pension and sovereign wealth funds&#8212;must prioritize value creation. That means not voting in support of stock-based compensation and no longer supplying hedge funds with large amounts of capital or lending them stock. (3) Government should regulate the relationship between hedge funds and pension funds (if the latter don&#8217;t do so voluntarily), tax &#8220;carried interest&#8221; as ordinary income, tax trades, and revisit the overall tax structure.

The Rise (and Likely Fall) of the Talent Economy

Reimpresión: R1410B Desde 1960, la economía estadounidense ha pasado de financiar en gran medida la explotación de los recursos naturales a aprovechar al máximo el talento. Como resultado, las recompensas para los ejecutivos y los financieros se han disparado. Pero en las últimas dos décadas más o menos, sostiene el autor, ha quedado cada vez más claro que gran parte de este talento se basa en negociar valor más que en crearlo: el grupo de más rápido crecimiento del Forbes La lista de 400 es de gestores de fondos de cobertura. Es más, los incentivos basados en acciones, que tenían por objeto alinear los intereses de los altos ejecutivos con los de los accionistas a largo plazo, en realidad están alentando a los directores ejecutivos a servir a los intereses de los operadores a corto plazo. Los perdedores en este juego son los empleados que realizan trabajos de rutina, cuyas recompensas se están reduciendo o cuyos puestos de trabajo están desapareciendo. Esta situación ha creado una creciente e insostenible desigualdad de ingresos. Martin sugiere que deben suceder tres cosas si queremos evitar que se impongan medidas radicales y hostiles al talento en las urnas: (1) El talento debe ejercer cierta autodisciplina y reducir sus expectativas. (2) Los inversores —principalmente los fondos de pensiones y de inversión soberana— deben priorizar la creación de valor. Eso significa no votar a favor de la compensación basada en acciones y dejar de suministrar grandes cantidades de capital a los fondos de cobertura ni prestarles acciones. (3) El gobierno debería regular la relación entre los fondos de cobertura y los fondos de pensiones (si estos últimos no lo hacen voluntariamente), gravar los «intereses devengados» como ingresos ordinarios, gravar las operaciones y revisar la estructura tributaria general.

El auge (y la probable ca&iacute;da) de la econom&iacute;a del talento

Reprint: R1410B Since 1960 the U.S. economy has moved from largely financing the exploitation of natural resources to making the most of talent. The rewards to executives and financiers have skyrocketed as a result. But over the past two decades or so, the author argues, it has become increasingly clear that much of this talent is trading value rather than creating it: The fastest-growing group on the Forbes 400 list is hedge fund managers. What’s more, stock-based incentives, which were intended to align the interests of top executives with those of long-term shareholders, are actually encouraging CEOs to serve the interests of short-term traders. The losers in this game are employees engaged in routine work, whose rewards are shrinking or whose jobs are disappearing. This state of affairs has created a growing—and unsustainable—inequality of income. Martin suggests that three things must happen if we are to avoid radical and talent-hostile steps imposed through the ballot box: (1) Talent must exert some self-discipline and lower its expectations. (2) Investors—primarily pension and sovereign wealth funds—must prioritize value creation. That means not voting in support of stock-based compensation and no longer supplying hedge funds with large amounts of capital or lending them stock. (3) Government should regulate the relationship between hedge funds and pension funds (if the latter don’t do so voluntarily), tax “carried interest” as ordinary income, tax trades, and revisit the overall tax structure.

El auge (y la probable caída) de la economía del talento

Resumen.

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